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Change in trade barriers and capital flow creates opportunities for redesigning the 
food chain. The orange juice chain in U.S. and Brazil provides an interesting 
illustration of how institutional harmonization, high import tariff rates and 
complementary capabilities open new opportunities for strategic alliances and the 
re-arrangement in the FCOJ chain. This finding has the following implications. 
First, trade barriers are not enough to support FDI and related internationalization 
decisions. Second, the perspective of market integration creates a positive 
environment for new strategic alliances and the re-design of the food chain. And 
third, the existence of complementary capabilities between foreign and domestic 
companies is a necessary condition for this type of supply chain re-arrangement. 
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Introduction  
 
Change in trade barriers and capital flow creates opportunities for redesigning the 
food chain. In the most prominent view, trade barriers foster foreign direct 
investment (FDI) as an alternative to explore competencies that may be replicated 
in the host country (Dunning, 1998). Inasmuch as the relative cost of exporting 
increases when trade barriers are high, firms may prefer to expand its sales by 
investing in a new plant in the host country. As a consequence, the higher the trade 
barriers, the higher FDI will be. On the other hand, the institutional harmonization 
that emerges with market integration – including lower trade barriers – promotes 
FDI because firms are more likely to invest when they know the rules that govern 
market competition. Moreover, the institutional environment tends to be more 
stable in integrated economies, with a positive effect on investment level. Regional 
trade blocks such as NAFTA and Mercosur are illustrative cases where lower trade 
barriers were associated to an increase in FDI. 
 
More important than knowing which effect prevails for a given level of trade 
barriers is that the perspective of market integration may combine both effects in 
the same direction. We submit that the orange juice chain in the United States (US) 
and Brazil, the dominant players in the global frozen concentrated orange juice 
(FCOJ) market, provides an interesting illustration of how change in market 
integration provides incentives for FDI and the redesign of the food chain. In 
particular, we argue that supply chain redesign in the form of vertical 
desintegration and cross-boder strategic alliances allows participants to deeply 
explore existing capabilities. This study explores FDI by western hemisphere food 
processors in the US market with focus on the FCOJ industry in Florida and 
Brazil’s southeastern region, particularly the state of Sao Paulo. In order to address 




Combined, Brazil and the United States are responsible for half of the world’s total 
supply of oranges and 85% of total orange juice processing capacity. More strikingly, 
orange production and processing is concentrated in just two states: Florida and Sao 
Paulo. Both industries compete globally in intermediary product markets, 
particularly in frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ). Industry participants, 
however, are quite complementary in competencies: Brazilian processors focus on 
orange crushing and logistics while US companies dominate ready-to-drink and not-
from-concentrate juice markets. 
 
Since its beginning, the Brazilian orange juice industry has been connected to its 
Florida counterpart. The orange juice industry began operations in Brazil in 1962, 
when a severe freeze in Florida caused a shortage in the US market. At the time 
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was thus targeted to the US market. US companies arrived in Brazil with capital 
and technology, and formed strategic alliances with packinghouse owners that had 
access to orange growers. 
 
Forty years later, the Brazilian orange juice industry is the largest in volume and 
the most competitive in the world. Brazilian FCOJ exports account for 85% of total 
international trade despite high tariff rates in major export markets, including in 
the US, in the European Union (EU) and in Southeast Asia. The competitiveness of 
the FCOJ industry in Brazil is based on low input costs, efficiency in plant 
operation and the bulk transportation system, which comprises tank-farm trucks, 
vessels and dedicated port terminals in each export destination. The bulk 
transportation system alone allows for cost savings of 15% of final FCOJ price 
relative to the use of the traditional 200-liter barrel. The Brazilian industry, 
therefore, has its main competitive advantage in logistics as competitors do not 
have sufficiently large scale to exploit bulk transportation systems. Even the US 
industry does not extensively use bulk transportation because orange juice 
deliveries are dispersed in several distribution channels. 
 
The Brazilian orange juice industry is highly concentrated, since the four leading 
processors control over 85% of total crushing capacity. Two family-owned domestic 
companies founded in the 1960s as packing houses have a combined 60% share of 
total industry crushing capacity. The third ranked company is the French 
multinational Dreyfus with a 12% share, followed by Citrovita, another Brazilian 
based company, with 11%. The concentration in crushing capacity is similar to the 
one observed in FCOJ exports, with smaller changes due to idle capacity or toll 
processing contracts between some processors and growers’ pools (Neves, Marino 
and Nassar, 2002). Concentration has been rising due to the ongoing consolidation 
process.  In 2004 industry leaders Citrosuco and Cutrale acquired Cargill’s assets in 
its Brazilian citrus division, which used to be the third ranked company. This 
transaction was approved by the Brazilian Competition Policy Agency (CADE) in 
2005 (Brazilian Ministry of Finance, 2005). 
 
The main variable that dictates competition in the FCOJ industry is control of the 
bulk transportation system. Although there are about 30 orange processing 
companies in Brazil, the four leading processors control the entire bulk 
transportation system. Since Brazilian exports are predominantly in FCOJ form 
and bulk transportation systems have cost savings of 15% of final FCOJ price, these 
four processors also hold dominant positions in export markets. Other orange 
processors have two alternatives: rent larger firms’ bulk transportation systems or 
explore the small but growing domestic orange juice market. 
 
It is also noteworthy that the Brazilian FCOJ industry has some features that make 
tacit collusion more likely. Not only is market concentration high, but also FCOJ is 
a homogeneous product with low price elasticity, stable demand and slow Azevedo and Chaddad / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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technological change. Taken together, these industry structure characteristics 
reduce coordination costs among firms (homogeneous product and stability of 
demand and technology) and increase the benefits of cooperation (low price 
elasticity) thereby favoring industry coordination (Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington, 
1997).  
 
With regard to the US industry structure, data are available for the industry 
defined as frozen fruit, juice and vegetable manufacturing (NAICS code 311411) as 
the US Census of Manufacturers does not provide disaggregated data for the FCOJ 
industry. There are 177 processors in this industry with combined value of 
shipments reaching US$10 billion. The four largest processors account for 34% of 
total industry shipment value. 
 
However, concentration is more pronounced in the narrowly defined orange juice 
market. According to Hodges et al. (2001), there are currently 52 citrus processing 
plants in Florida. Citrus juice products shipped by Florida processors were valued 
at US$3.5 billion in the 1999-2000 season. The two largest orange juice brands – 
Minute Made (Coca Cola Co.) and Tropicana (PepsiCo) – have a combined market 
share of over 50%. Citrus World, a marketing cooperative formed by citrus 
packinghouses in Florida, owns the third largest orange juice brand called Florida’s 
Natural (Jacobs, 1994).  
 
The four leading companies in Brazil are key players in the Florida industry, 
following the acquisition of incumbent plants during the 1990s. Since their entry in 
the US market, the two largest orange juice brands (Minute Mate and Tropicana) 
have discontinued crushing and focused in blending and marketing consumer-ready 




There are several private organizational arrangements to govern transaction 
hazards. Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) has the merit of providing a model 
that, given the characteristics of a particular transaction, predicts the adopted 
governance structure. The argument initially presented by Williamson (1985) – and 
maintained in subsequent work (Williamson, 1991; 1996) – matches transaction 
dimensions (asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty) to the choice of a singular 
governance structure (market, hybrid or hierarchy), which is the most efficient 
among the set of possible structures in mitigating transactions costs. 
 
The transactions between growers and crushing firms, both in the US and Brazil, 
are predominantly governed by non-market mechanisms. Oranges are highly 
perishable, which leads to temporal asset specificity, and the volume produced by 
growers and required by crushing firms is much greater than alternative sources of 
supply and demand for oranges, making assets dedicated to each other.  In the Azevedo and Chaddad / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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presence of such high levels of asset specificity it is expected that firms will employ 
governance structures that provides greater control over the transaction such as 
contracts and vertical integration (Williamson, 1985). 
 
Indeed, 95% of citrus fruits in the US are transacted by means of non-market 
arrangements. In particular, 88% of citrus output is sold through marketing 
contracts between growers and processors, including contracts with farmer-owned 
packing houses. Additionally, 7% of citrus fruits are produced and processed by 
vertically integrated firms (Harris et al., 2002). The degree of vertical integration 
was higher in the late 1980s. In part, the reduction in vertically integrated orange 
production and processing in Florida is associated with the acquisition of crushing 
plants by Brazilian firms. 
 
The coexistence of marketing contracts and vertical integration is also evident in 
the Brazilian orange industry, with two remarkable differences relative to the US: 
(i) the proportion of backward vertical integration into orange growing is higher 
among Brazilian processors; and (ii) marketing contracts are based on pound solids 
in Florida (directly related to processing efficiency) but on boxes delivered (volume) 
in Brazil. These distinct characteristics are interrelated, and suggest that vertical 
coordination in the US orange industry is more efficient than in its Brazilian 
counterpart (Fernandes, 2003). 
 
Trade Barriers for FCOJ 
 
Tariff and non-tariff barriers are used differently by Brazil and the US. Whereas 
the former generally levies higher average tariffs, the latter imposes lower average 
tariffs but with higher standard deviation. Additionally, Brazil mainly uses ad 
valorem tariffs in contrast to the US reliance on other forms of protection against 
imports, including specific lump-sum tariffs, quotas and non-tariff barriers such as 
SPS restrictions and direct subsidies to domestic producers. Consequently, the US 
tends to be more open to international trade while heavily protecting selected 
industries against foreign competition. Among those is the FCOJ industry, which 
receives protection against imports from several countries but particularly from the 
competitive Brazilian FCOJ industry. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the available information supporting the distinctions drawn 
between the US and Brazil. Tariff rates applied to agrifood industries, including 
tobacco and textiles, are higher than the average in both countries. Tariff rates, 
however, are on average more than three times higher in Brazil than in the US. In 
addition, the standard deviation of agrifood industry tariff rates levied in the US is 
twice as high as in Brazil. This suggests that US tariff rates are selectively used to 
protect specific domestic industries. Indeed, the maximum tariff rate reaches 350% 
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with average tariff rates below the world agriculture tariff rate, which averages 
62% (Gibson et al., 2001). 
 
Table 1: Summary of Tariff Schedules for Brazil and the US 
Brazil US 
  Total Agri-Food Total  Agri-Food 
Number of items  9,408  1,165  10,311  2,102 
Average tariff rate (%)  28.8  34.4  5.6  10.1 
Standard deviation  10.5  12.2  12.9  25.6 
Maximum tariff rate (%)  55.0  55.0  350.0  350.0 
Minimum tariff rate (%)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Source: FTAA Hemispheric Database in Jank et al. (2001). 
 
 
As Jank et al. (2001: 115) point out, the US strategy of “chirurgic protection impacts 
directly the main export products of the Brazilian agri-system.” The orange juice is 
a remarkable example of this type of protection. To protect Florida citrus and 
orange juice production, imports from outside NAFTA have to pay a specific tariff 
rate of US$0.297 per SSE1 gallon for FCOJ and US$0.175 per SSE gallon for not-
from-concentrate (NFC) orange juice. As tariff rates for FCOJ are a fixed amount 
for a given volume, the effective protection increases when the price of the FCOJ 
falls and decreases when it becomes more expensive. For the average price observed 
in 2002, the specific tariff rate for FCOJ and NFC was equivalent to an ad valorem 
tariff rate of 56.7% and 13.7% respectively (Neves, Marino and Nassar, 2002). The 
effective protection of NFC seems lower but higher transportation costs provide an 
effective “natural” protection. 
 
Table 2 presents the US import tariff rate for FCOJ for different countries in the 
last fifteen years and schedule until 2007. Two relevant conclusions may be drawn 
from the data. First, the protection of Florida’s industry is not equitable as Mexico 
and Caribbean countries receive a favorable treatment as closer trading partners. 
Second, the tariff has been declining but there is no further perspective of lower 
trade barriers for Brazilian orange juice in the years ahead. 
 
The changes in tariff rates in the last fifteen years had an important impact on US 
imports of FCOJ (Table 3). The main effect was a significant decrease in US imports 
in the beginning of the 1990s. The second effect was a reduction in the Brazilian 
share with concomitant increases in imports from Caribbean countries with no tariff 
protection. The expected fall of tariff rates on imports from Mexico after 2007 will 
probably have a negative effect on imports from Brazil. Also relevant is the 
perspective of hemispheric integration with the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA), which will require increased institutional harmonization between its 
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member-countries. The scenario of deep changes in trading rules between Brazil 
and the US not only affected trade flows, but created new investment opportunities, 
particularly towards the redesign of the citrus chain, with remarkable consequences 
on trade and foreign direct investment. The next section further explores this issue. 
 
Table 2: Tariff Rate Quota Schedule for Imported FCOJ To US (US$/SEE gallon) 
Mexico 
Year 
In Quota (a) OverQuota  (b) Snapback  (c) 
Canada Caribbean  Brazil 
1989 n/a  n/a  n/a  0.3143  Free 0.3502 
1991 n/a  n/a  n/a  0.2423  Free 0.3502 
1993 n/a  n/a  n/a  0.1742  Free 0.3502 
1995 0.1751  0.3327  0.3415  0.1022 Free  0.3415 
1997 0.1751  0.3152  0.3237  0.0341 Free  0.3237 
1999 0.1751  0.2977  0.3059  free  Free  0.3059 
2001 0.1751  0.2977  0.2972  free  Free  0.2972 
2003 0.1751  0.2977  0.2972  free  Free  0.2972 
2005 0.1751  0.1786  0.2972  free  Free  0.2972 
2007 0.0595  0.0595  0.2972  free  Free  0.2972 
a. Tariff applied to first 40 million single strength equivalent (SSE) gallons of FCOJ imports from 
Mexico.  
b. Tariff applied to imports from Mexico exceeding 40 million SSE gallons of FCOJ up to 70 million 
SSE gallons from 1994 through 2002, and up to 90 million SSE gallons from 2003 through 2008.  
c. Tariff applied to imports from Mexico exceeding 70 million SSE gallons from 1994 through 2002 
and to imports from Mexico exceeding 90 million SSE gallons from 2003 through 2008 if a price 
trigger is also eclipsed (a price-based safeguard will provide for the reimposition of higher MFN 
tariffs if FCOJ daily average prices for 5 consecutive days fall below the previous 5-year average for 
that month). 
Source: NAFTA, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative in Fernandes (2003). 
 
 
Table 3: US Imports of FCOJ by Countries (US$ 1,000) 
Country  1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 
Brazil  463,169 220,843 202,282 103,949 124,572 218,820 109,115 196,323 
México  58,092 43,907 16,503 63,929 43,481 49,526 28,189  6,905 
Costa  Rica  0,656 1,736 2,448  6,984  18,096 16,461 33,718 35,608 
Belize  8,532 4,029 6,695 8,389  16,089 13,077 19,667 11,304 
Canada  0,257 0,918 2,115 2,963 2,466 4,224 4,867 5,569 
Honduras  0,602 0,547 1,674 2,818 3,632 1,437 4,776 1,794 
Dominican Rep.  0,000  0,296  0,578 0,495 1,317 0,160 1,416 1,903 
Other countries  7,914 2,481 1,962 1,834 0,894 2,298 0,956 5,507 
Total  539,222 274,757 234,257 191,361 210,547 306,003 202,704 264,913 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). 
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Food Chain Redesign: Entry of Brazilian Processors in Florida 
 
In the 1990s, the four leading firms in the Brazilian orange juice industry – Cutrale, 
Citrosuco, Cargill and Dreyfus – started operations in Florida by acquiring existing 
plants formerly operated by US companies. The explicit motivation for this strategic 
movement was the increasing difficulties that these firms faced in accessing the US 
market, the world’s largest in terms of orange juice volume. Since the late 1980s, 
Brazilian FCOJ exports to the US have been declining in both absolute and relative 
terms. In the 1990s the US became increasingly self-sufficient as orange production 
became less vulnerable to freezes, the result of the relocation of orange groves to 
southern Florida. Consequently, Brazilian FCOJ exports to the US fell from roughly 
half of total Brazilian exports in the 1980s to less than 20% in 1996. 
 
Three factors caused the decline in Brazilian FCOJ exports to the US. First, as 
previously mentioned, FCOJ is a sensitive product under protection of the US tariff 
rate system. Second, other countries enjoy preferential tariff rates, which reduce the 
competitiveness of Brazilian exports. Third, orange juice consumption in the US has 
been marked by a trend towards NFC juice. The share of NFC in the US market 
accounts for almost 50% of total orange juice volume. There is a “natural” trade 
barrier in the case of NFC juice because it has more than five times the weight and 
volume of equivalent FCOJ and its transportation requires greater effort in quality 
control. Notwithstanding logistics barriers, Brazil began exporting NFC to the US 
in 2002 at approximately 3% of FCOJ exports. 
 
The acquisition of US plants by processors based in Brazil is part of their growth 
strategy in response to the self-sufficiency of US domestic production. However, this 
movement caused a rearrangement of the US orange juice production chain and was 
beneficial to the beverage companies that were former owners of the acquired 
plants. 
 
The orange juice industry is part of the beverage supply chain. Some beverage 
products use orange juice – in frozen, concentrated or pasteurized form – as a raw 
material input. The final product may be ready-to-drink orange juice, other 
beverages that use orange juice in their blends, or concentrated juice that is 
prepared at home by consumers or at food services. The recent acquisitions of US 
crushing plants by Brazilian firms are better understood as a reorganization of this 
supply chain in the US, with possible emulation in other countries. 
 
In the early 1990s, the major US orange juice processors were large and diversified 
beverage companies, including Coca-Cola (Minute Maid) and PepsiCo (Tropicana). 
Although there is no technological similarity between processing carbonated soft 
beverages and FCOJ, those companies tend to be diversified in order to deeply 
explore intangible assets – such as brand name and marketing capabilities – that 
are key variables in their transaction with final consumers. As a consequence, their Azevedo and Chaddad / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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main business is ready-to-drink beverages that require specific competencies in 
marketing and branding rather than in one specific beverage. By means of 
diversification, beverage companies are able to explore economies of scope in an 
extensive product line that make use of the same intangible assets. Among these 
assets, brand name, marketing research and access to marketing channels are 
noteworthy. 
 
In the juice business, they need a reliable source of orange juice (NFC and FCOJ) 
both in terms of regularity and quality in order to keep up with their branding 
efforts. Until the early 1990s, transaction costs arguments help explain why Coca 
Cola and Pepsi operated their own citrus processing plants, which were dedicated 
assets to the beverage industry. In addition to the vertically integrated beverage 
companies, smaller independent citrus processors sold orange juice to beverage 











Figure 1: Orange Juice Production Chain 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the orange juice production chain, from agricultural inputs to the 
final consumer. Until 1990, the largest beverage companies, such as Minute Maid 
and Tropicana, operated in the beverage industry, citrus processing and, in some 
cases, orange groves. Upstream vertical coordination – e.g. vertical integration on 
orange groves – is further explored latter in this section. 
 
At the start of the 1990s there was a transformation in the US orange juice 
industry. The family-owned Brazilian company Cutrale acquired Minute Maid 
processing plants. Subsequently, Citrosuco bought the citrus processing plant of 
Alcoma, a citrus grower that used to be vertically integrated in processing. Then 
Cargill – whose citrus department was based in Brazil – also entered the Florida 
market, acquiring the Procter and Gamble plant. Dreyfus followed and bought the 
processing plant of Winter Garden (Fernandes, 2003). As already mentioned, 
Brazilian FCOJ exports to US has been decreasing for three main reasons: high 
tariff rates, preferential tariff rates for competing countries and the increased share 
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alone are not sufficient to explain why Brazilian companies were attracted to 
acquire Florida based companies. 
 
We submit that two other factors are relevant to this strategic movement. First, 
there was a perspective of increasing integration in the western hemisphere with 
FTAA, which would lead to increased institutional harmonization. Second, 
Brazilian companies developed distinctive efficiencies in orange processing 
thatpartially explains these acquisitions. Besides having access to state-of-the-art 
orange crushing technology, the leading Brazilian companies also developed 
knowledge on logistics, lay-out and storage that were possible due to their larger 
scale. This capability could not be fully explored with plants located in Brazil as 
trade barriers and consumer trends towards NFC juices protect Florida production. 
 
Table 4: Backward Vertical Coordination in Florida Citrus Processors 
Type of Vertical Coordination  1989-1990 Season  2001-2002 Season 







Indian River Foods 
Lykes-Pasco 





    
    





Citrus World (two plants) 
Holly Hill  
Ocean Spray 
    
    
Processor  Adams Packing  






Procter and Gamble 
Sun Pac  
Sun Pure  
Tropicana (two plants) 
Cargill Citro Pure (three 
plants)  
Citrosuco 
Cutrale (two plants) 
Dreyfus (two plants) 
Peace River  
Silver Springs  
Tropicana (two plants) 
    
Source: Fernandes (2003). 
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What is remarkable in the orange juice case, however, is that Brazilian FCOJ 
processors and US beverage firms are not in essence competitors. Instead of 
competing, Cutrale and Minute Maid developed a strategic alliance, which is the 
basis for the vertical disintegration in the US orange juice production chain in the 
1990s. Counting on a reliable and efficient orange juice supply, beverage companies 
focused on their core business in order to fully explore competencies in marketing – 
particularly in blends, branding and distribution channels – and economies of scope 
in their beverage product line. Consequently, the acquisition of US citrus processing 
plants by Brazilian companies is part of the orange juice chain restructuring, which 
led to a more efficient form of organization. 
 
The effects of recent acquisitions by Brazilian companies are also evident in vertical 
coordination strategies between orange growers and processors. Table 4 shows the 
incidence of three types of vertical coordination arrangements and captures a 
dramatic transformation in the backward vertical integration strategies of Florida 
processors. In 1990, the dominant mode of organization was grower-processor 
integration, followed by non-integrated processors and cooperatives. In contrast, 
focused, non-integrated orange juice processors were the dominant players in 2002, 
with a lower participation of vertically integrated grower-processors. 
 
This industry arrangement differs from that observed in Brazil, where processors 
have their own orange groves, supplying on average 30% of their raw input needs 
(Table 5). Contrasting to the trends observed in Florida, the degree of vertical 
integration in Brazil, although always present, increased since the late 1980s. It is 
noteworthy that companies that operate in Brazil and Florida rely only on contracts 
with orange growers to supply US based plants, as opposed to their strategy of 
partial vertical integration in Brazil. 
 
Table 5: Backward Vertical Coordination in Brazilian Citrus Processors 






Source: Brazilian Orange Growers Association data in Brazilian Ministry of Finance (2005). 
 
 
According to Fernandes (2003), several factors explain different vertical 
coordination patterns in Brazil relative to the US, including industry concentration, 
the risk of drought and different contractual design features – such as payment by 
pound solids in US and by boxes delivered in Brazil – which are more effective in 
the US because of closer incentive alignment between processors and orange Azevedo and Chaddad / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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growers. Moreover, the organization of orange growers is quite different in the two 
countries, which may have consequences on vertical coordination strategies. While 
orange growers in Brazil count on collective organizations with weak conditions for 
promoting horizontal coordination (Marino and Azevedo, 2003), growers in the US 
are better organized and have access to political resources, which explain the 
persistence of protection against FCOJ imports. One of the important differences in 
the way growers organize themselves in both regions is the historical role of 
cooperatives in the US as opposed to the short-lived experience of Brazilian 
cooperatives in the orange juice chain – the most prominent case being Frutesp, 
which lasted 13 years until Dreyfus acquired it in 1991. 
 
Vertical alliances between orange juice processors and beverage companies may be 
replicated in other countries, including Brazil, where the ready-to-drink orange 
juice segment is growing fast but is still rather small. In order to explore this 
emergent market segment, Brazilian orange processors have established vertical 
alliances with dairy firms and retailers with competitive advantages in branding 
and distribution of perishable goods, such as milk and NFC orange juice. It is likely 
that this type of alliance will progressively incorporate beverage companies with 
international brands such as Minute Maid. 
 
The orange juice case provides an interesting example of the interaction between 
trade, FDI and strategic alliances among US and Brazilian companies. The impact 
of the FTAA will largely depend on the effective removal of trade barriers for FCOJ 
in the US. Without such trade barriers, Brazilian companies may reduce orange 
juice production in Florida and substitute for imports originating from their 
Brazilian operations. Nevertheless, the strategic alliance between orange juice 
processors and beverage companies will probably expand to other countries in the 
region. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Trade barriers are traditionally seen as an incentive for FDI, which may be an 
alternative to exports as an internationalization strategy. This traditional view only 
partially explains the FDI activity of Brazilian orange juice firms. The perspective 
of market integration with continuing negotiations of FTAA signals a trend to 
institutional harmonization that affect firm-level investment strategies. The 
perspective of integration fosters FDI because firms tend to integrate foreign 
markets in their strategies, making room for strategic alliances and the 
‘reinvention’ of food chains. 
 
The two effects are rarely observed in conjunction, inasmuch as barriers are high or 
low. However, the Brazilian FCOJ industry experienced both effects: high trade 
barriers and the perspective of economic integration in the FTAA. As a consequence, 
firms expect institutional harmonization and market integration, opening new Azevedo and Chaddad / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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opportunities for strategic alliances and the redesign of the food chain in general. 
Meanwhile, Brazilian orange juice firms face high import tariff rates and no 
perspective of significant tariff reduction in the near future. Thus there are strong 
incentives for them to redirect investments to orange crushing plants located in the 
US. 
 
The strategic move observed in the FCOJ industry differs from those of other 
Brazilian food processors that cope with high trade barriers when exporting to the 
US. For example, the Brazilian poultry industry faces sanitary restrictions when 
exporting to the US, which should have a positive effect on direct investments in the 
US. This evidence suggests that the existence of significant trade barriers is not a 
sufficient condition for FDI.  
 
The additional variable that explains FCOJ chain redesign is the existence of 
complementary capabilities among Brazilian crushing firms (particularly Citrosuco 
and Cutrale) and US beverage firms (Tropicana and Minute Maid). This was not the 
case of the main Brazilian poultry firms (Sadia and Perdigao), which have core 
capabilities that are similar to those of Tyson Foods and other US poultry 
processors. In short, the perspective of market integration creates opportunities to 
direct investment and strategic alliances as long as there are complementary 
capabilities to be explored in those new arrangements. 
 
As there is a cost of redesigning a supply chain, the combination of FDI and 
strategic alliances occurs only when there are significant gains, such as exploring 
more intensely the relevant capabilities. This finding has relevant implications to 
agribusiness managers. First, trade barriers are not enough to support FDI and 
related internationalization decisions. Second, the perspective of market integration 
creates a positive environment, mainly due to institutional harmonization, for 
strategic alliances and the redesign of the food chain. And third, the existence of 
complementary capabilities between foreign and domestic companies is a necessary 
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